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Abstract
This paper shows that most of the growth of world trade during the last
three decades can be explained by two empirical facts: i) the opening
up of China and ii) the pattern of net financial flows from capital-scarce
to capital-abundant countries. I present novel evidence documenting
that their simultaneous occurrence has increased differences in capital-
labour ratios among the group of open economies. Using a dynamic
model which combines factor-proportions trade in commodities with in-
ternational trade in financial assets, I illustrate the resulting impact on
the patterns of specialisation and trade. I calibrate this model and find
that it can account for more than 50% of the expansion of global trade
between 1980 and 2007. It is also capable of predicting international
investment patterns which are consistent with the data.
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1 Introduction
The rapid growth of world trade has been one of the most striking develop-
ments in the global economy over the last three decades. Figure 1.1 shows that
the traded share of world output rose from 16% to 22% between 1980 and 2007
− an increase of 40%. In this paper I argue that increasing factor-proportions
differences explain most of the expansion of global trade.
Earlier attempts to determine why world trade has increased have strug-
gled to account for the magnitude of the phenomenon. Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) show that tariff reductions are the most significant cause of trade growth
between countries.1 Yet, as extensively documented by Yi (2003), the mod-
est decline in average tariff rates among the largest economies implies that
standard modern trade models cannot match the nature and extent of the
growth in world trade, which poses a “quantitative and qualitative puzzle” for
international trade theory.
Yi’s paper appeals to the increasing vertical specialisation of international
production chains, but he finds that the resulting trading patterns can account
for at most 50% of the rise in global trade. Bergoeing and Kehoe (2003)
also find that a calibrated new trade model fails to explain the increase in
trade relative to world output, even under the assumption of non-homothetic
preferences. Recently, Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007) have shown that a model
of endogenous factor accumulation and specialisation provides a better fit for
the large response of U.S. trade to small tariff reductions. However, the growth
of world trade remains largely unexplained.
This paper puts forward the view that world trade has increased because
the group of open economies has become less homogenous. In particular,
I document that differences between the capital-labour ratios of the largest
trading countries have increased due to the opening up of China − a large and
very labour-abundant economy − and the pattern of net financial flows from
capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries, sometimes referred to as “global
imbalances” or “South-North capital flows”. Classical trade theory predicts
that countries specialise in industries which best suit their relative endowments
of production factors, and that this specialisation gives rise to gains from
international commodity trade. I calibrate such a model using estimates of
countries’ endowments of human and physical capital and show that it can
explain 50-80% of world trade growth between 1980 and 2007.
1The authors find a significantly smaller role for transportation costs in explaining in-
creases in trade. Moreover, Hummels (2007) notes that changes in international transporta-
tion in the second half of the twentieth century did not translate into an unambiguous trend
of declining shipping costs.
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Figure 1.1.: The Growth of World Commodity Trade, 1980-2007
Figure 1.2.: Dispersion of K/H-ratios Over Time
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Figure 1.2 illustrates the evolution of the world distribution capital stocks
per effective worker, henceforth referred to as “capital-labour ratios” or “K/H-
ratios” for brevity. The solid line describes the trade-weighted average factor
abundance − a measure of the dispersion of capital-labour ratios among the
largest, most open economies.2 It shows that the dispersion of factor propor-
tions has increased steadily since 1980. Part of this is due to the rise in trade
between capital-abundant countries (the “North”) and capital-scarce countries
(the “South”) as a share of world trade. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, 70%
of the overall growth in world trade since 1980 has been due to the expansion
of North-South trade.
According to classical trade theory, differences in relative factor endow-
ments are a potential cause of specialisation and, hence, trade in international
goods markets. Figure 1.3 provides evidence to this effect. It correlates the
average capital intensity of U.S. imports, based on sector-level trade data,
with the source country’s capital-labour ratio for the years 1985, 1995, 2000
and 2005.3 The graphs document that, as capital-labour ratios have diverged
over time, relative factor endowments have indeed become a more significant
determinant of the type of commodities imported by the United States from
its different partner countries: since 2000 factor-proportions differences alone
have accounted for approximately 30% of the differences in the average capital
intensity of U.S. imports from its major trading partners.
Using my model, I find that specialisation due to increased differences in
factor proportions is responsible for at least 52% of the growth in world trade
since 1980. Most of the trade growth explained by my calibrations is due to
the opening of China, while 10-18% are due to financial globalisation and the
resulting pattern of South-North capital flows. The dashed line in Figure 1.2
highlights that the increase in factor-proportions differences since the mid-
1990s would not have occurred in financial autarky.4 The dotted line shows
that differences between capital-labour ratios would have decreased if China
had remained largely closed to foreign trade.
The emergence of China as a large trading economy is generally recognised
2The trade-weighted average factor abundance is calculated as
∑
c
∣∣∣KctKt − HctHt ∣∣∣ Xct+MctXt+Mt ,
where Kct is country c’s stock of physical capital, Hct its stock of human capital and Xct
and Mct represent the value of its exports and imports, respectively. I drop the subscript c
for world variables. Details on data sources and construction are provided in Appendix A1.
3Appendix A2 contains a more detailed regression analysis as well as a discussion of data
sources and construction.
4I estimate counterfactual “financial autarky” capital stocks by cumulating countries’
gross domestic savings, rather than the usual investments, since domestic investment equals
saving in financially closed economies. The construction of this data is discussed in greater
detail in Appendix A1.
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Figure 1.3.: Factor Proportions and Specialisation
Figure 1.4.: Investment and Country Risk, 1980-2007
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as the result of an exogenous policy shock − the program of “reform and open-
ing up” initiated by the Communist Party of China under Deng Xiaoping in
1978. Its significance for any factor-proportions-based view of international
commodity trade derives from China’s sheer size and labour-abundance. Al-
though China’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries is widely
acknowledged,5 to the best of my knowledge this paper provides the first quan-
titative assessment of the China’s contribution to the growth in world trade
from a factor-proportions perspective. My findings suggest that the failure of
previous studies to match the growth in world trade may have been partly due
to their focus on tariff declines among relatively similar countries. Allowing
for the opening up of countries whose economies differ significantly from the
characteristics of the North has the potential to explain a large portion of
global trade growth as a result of classical comparative advantage.
The pattern of South-North capital flows − and the resulting increase in
factor-proportions differences − constitutes a well-established puzzle for the
theory of international finance.6 Traditional one-good models of international
investment have tended to emphasise locally diminishing returns to capital
as the main motive for international financial flows. Barring a strong pos-
itive correlation between savings rates and total factor productivities, such
models would predict capital to flow from capital-abundant to capital-scarce
regions in search of higher returns, thereby reducing factor-proportions differ-
ences. I allow for international asset trade in my model and demonstrate that
the increased prevalence of factor-proportions trade may explain why capital
flows have increased factor-proportions differences, contrary to the conven-
tional view.
Trade theory has established that, under well-defined conditions, trade in
goods with different factor intensities may eliminate local diminishing returns
to production factors, and thus the main theoretical reason for capital to flow
from North to South. Suppose therefore that instead of rate-of-return differ-
ences, diversification and risk sharing are the dominant motives for interna-
tional asset trade. In that case, barring a strong negative correlation between
savings rates and country risk, capital should flow from risky to safe regions
which may exacerbate factor proportions differences, raising specialisation and
trade.
Basic empirical tests verify that country-specific investment risk has been
an important determinant of international investment patterns over the last
three decades. In a panel of the 28 largest economies, a measure of country
5See, for example, Rodrik (2006) and Amiti and Freund (2010).
6See, among others, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006), Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2006) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008)
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risk - based on historical country risk scores from the Political Risk Services
Group (PRSG) - is strongly and negatively correlated with the GDP-share of
investment after controlling for domestic savings and country and time fixed
effects (see Figure 1.4 and the formal regressions in Appendix A2). As part
of my calibration exercise, I show that a model in which factor-proportions
trade eliminates local diminishing returns and agents engage in international
asset trade to hedge idiosyncratic investment risk can match international
investment patterns remarkably well.7
My paper adds to a long literature on the quantitative implications of
international trade models for the level and growth of world trade. The de-
velopment of the so-called “new” trade theory by Krugman (1979), Lancaster
(1980) and Helpman (1981) was motivated in part by the failure of traditional,
comparative-advantage-based models to explain the volume of world trade and
its concentration among a small group of industrialised countries. Helpman
(1987) demonstrates that, beyond this, new trade theory has implications for
trade growth, linking it to the similarity of countries’ incomes. However, sub-
sequent work by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Baier and Bergstrand (2001)
and Bergoeing and Kehoe (2003) has uncovered little evidence that this chan-
nel has played a quantitatively important role in the recent growth of world
trade, shifting attention towards declining trade frictions.
Yi (2003) argues that the decline in world tariffs in the last decades of the
20th century has been too small to match the observed growth in trade using a
Ricardian or new trade model with plausible assumptions about the elasticity
of substitution between goods. He attempts to explain this puzzle as the result
of an increase in vertical specialisation, whereby goods cross borders several
times during the production process, but his model leaves at least half of world
trade growth unaccounted for. My paper is complimentary with Yi’s insofar as
he assumes the pattern of vertical specialisation to be determined by classical
comparative advantage due to productivity differences. My calibrations also
assume a comparative-advantage motive for trade but show that horizontal
specialisation alone, driven by factor-proportions differences, can explain a
substantial part of the recent growth in world trade.
A recent paper by Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007) is most closely related to
the present work. The authors study the growth of U.S. trade from a dy-
7Antras and Caballero (2009) and Jin (2009) are two recent attempts to explain South-
North capital flows in the context of a Heckscher-Ohlin model. My model relates more closely
to the “portfolio approach” to the current account − pioneered by Kraay and Ventura (2003),
Ventura (2003) and Kraay et al. (2005). I expand on their partial-equilibrium international
portfolio model by embedding it in a many-good general-equilibrium framework in which
local diminishing returns disappear endogenously as a result of factor-proportions trade in
commodities.
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namic factor-proportions perspective. In their setting trade integration raises
the return to capital in capital-abundant countries and lowers it in capital-
scarce countries, thus eliciting more capital accumulation in the former, and
reducing it in the latter. They suggest that this dynamic implication of tariff
reductions can explain why small tariff reductions have had a large impact on
U.S. trade with the rest of the world. Unlike Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007),
I use factor-proportions differences to account for the growth in global trade
and I study the impact of an asymmetric increase in the trade openness of
capital-scarce regions. Moreover, I dispense with their assumption of financial
autarky, showing that international capital flows have played a significant part
in increasing specialisation and trade.8
The inability of factor-proportions models to explain the patterns and ex-
tent of world trade has led researchers to dismiss them as a tool for quanti-
tative studies in favour of new trade models. The main contribution of this
paper is to demonstrate that, as the volume of trade between capital-scarce
and capital-abundant countries has risen, factor-proportion have become cru-
cial for understanding the growth − albeit not the level − of world trade.
A secondary contribution of the paper is to highlight that a world in which
factor-proportions trade is prevalent provides a natural setting in which to
analyse the surprising pattern of South-North capital flows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the theoretical model and shows how it can be applied to study the impact on
factor proportions trade of i) the arrival of a new, labour-abundant country
and ii) the occurrence of financial globalisation. Section 3 calibrates the model
to real-world data in order assess how much of the growth in world trade over
the last three decades it can explain. It also considers the empirical realism
of the model-implied determinants of international capital flows. Section 4
concludes.
8My estimates suggest that the U.S. capital stock would have been approximately 15%
lower in 2007 in financial autarky. In fact, without sizable capital inflows the U.S. investment
rate would have declined over the last 30 years − contrary to the prediction of Cuñat and
Maffezzoli (2007).
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2 The Model
Below I outline a tractable general equilibrium model to illustrate the rela-
tionship between capital-labour ratios, the patterns of specialisation and the
volume of trade. The dynamic nature of the model allows me to examine the
determinants of capital accumulation under different assumptions about the
feasibility of cross-border asset trades.
Throughout, I emphasise the Heckscher-Ohlin view of international com-
modity trade: differences in regional factor proportions are a source of com-
parative advantage. Different regions of the world trade in K-intensive and
H-intensive intermediate goods, and regions specialise in the type of good
which uses their abundant factor intensively. I impose assumptions that guar-
antee that commodity trade equalises factor prices and derive an expression
which relates the traded share of world output to the distribution of factor en-
dowments. I then proceed to analyse two cases of interest for my subsequent
calibrations: the arrival of a new country (in Section 2.3) and the impact of
financial globalisation, modelled as the removal of all barriers to international
asset trade (in Section 2.4).
As Mundell (1957) first showed, net financial flows across borders are inde-
terminate if factor-proportions trade equalises factor returns and return differ-
entials are the only incentive for international asset trade. I show, by contrast,
that net flows are perfectly determined if agents have an incentive to trade fi-
nancial assets in order to hedge against idiosyncratic regional investment risk.9
Under a general set of conditions, regions with relatively safe (low-variance) in-
vestment technologies will attract the largest share of world asset investments
and, unless they also have proportionally higher savings rates, will be net re-
cipients of international financial flows. If, in addition, these regions do not
happen to be labour-abundant, such flows will exacerbate factor-proportions
differences and increase specialisation and trade.
The model highlights that the stylised facts described in the previous sec-
tion can be understood from the perspective of a neoclassical, frictionless world
hit by two exogenous shocks. First, a labour-abundant country − China −
has opened up to international goods trade. Second, financial globalisation has
occurred and asset trades between small (in terms of the size of their effec-
tive workforce) but safe regions and large but risky regions have exacerbated
factor-proportions differences.
9To my knowledge, Grossman and Razin (1984) constitutes the only other paper to point
out that the “substitutability” between commodity trade and capital flows in Heckscher-
Ohlin models may break down if uncertainty is introduced into the model. However, their
paper does not explore the dynamic macroeconomic implications of this possibility.
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2.1 Basic Setup
2.1.1 Endowments and Preferences
Consider a world consisting of large regions, c = 1, . . . , C, and inhabited by
two overlapping generations, the young and the old. Generations in region c
have a constant size Lc. In youth, agents in c are endowed with hc units of
human capital which they supply inelastically in their regional labour market,
at the given wage rate wct. A fraction 1− Sc of these agents is impatient and
derives utility only from consumption in youth. A fraction Sc is patient and
derives utility only from consumption in old age. At t, the region’s aggregate
savings, Bct, and consumption, Cct, are thus given by:
Bct = wctScHc
Cct = wct(1− Sc)Hc + rctBct−1
, (1)
where rct is the rate of return to savings in c at t and Hc ≡ hcLc.
2.1.2 Production
Final consumption and investment are identical Cobb-Douglas composites of
two intermediate goods:
Cct + Ict = Qct = Q
θ
cKtQ
1−θ
cHt with θ ∈ (0, 1) , (2)
where Ict denotes aggregate investment in c at t, Qct represents aggregate
industrial output and Qcjt is the input of intermediate good j ∈ {K,H} used
in aggregate production. Intermediate goods are assembled using two factors
of production − physical capital, Kct, and human capital, Hct − according to
Qcjt = K
αj
cjtH
1−αj
cjt with αj ∈ [0, 1] , j ∈ {K,H} . (3)
In the following, I will assume that αK > αH . Put plainly, production of the
intermediate good of the K-type uses physical capital relatively intensively,
while production of the intermediate good of the H-type uses human capital
relatively intensively. I also assume that final-good, intermediate-good and
factor markets are perfectly competitive and that final-good and intermediate-
good firms choose their inputs to maximise profits.
2.1.3 Savings, Investment and Capital Formation
Agents in c have exclusive access to an investment technology which allows
them to turn Ict units of investment in t into Kct+1 units of capital in t + 1,
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according to
Kct+1 = Act+1Ict, (4)
where Act+1 is stochastic with
Et (Act+1) = 1
V ar (Act+1) = σ
2
c
Cov (Act+1, Ac′t+1) = 0 ∀ c′ 6= c
. (5)
Capital depreciates fully in one period.
Since the final consumption good is assumed to be perishable, agents can
only transfer consumption to the future by making risky investments in physi-
cal capital stock. Investment risk is perfectly idiosyncratic.10 I shall therefore
refer to σc as a measure of c’s country risk.
2.1.4 Autarky Equilibrium
Suppose that region c exists in complete autarky. Defining Pct as the aggregate
price level, synonymous with the price of consumption and investment,
Pct =
(
PcKt
θ
)θ (
PcHt
1− θ
)1−θ
, (6)
where Pcjt is the price of intermediate good j. Perfect competition in intermediate-
good markets ensures that the price of intermediate goods equals their marginal
cost of production. Given perfect competition in factor markets,
Pcjt =
(
rct
αj
)αj ( wct
1− αj
)1−αj
for j ∈ {K,H} , (7)
where rct is the rental rate of capital. It is identical with the return to savings
as capital investments constitute this economy’s only means of postponing
consumption.
Imposing the normalisation Pct = 1 and letting goods and factor markets
clear, we obtain
QAct = K
α
ctH
1−α
c , (8)
rct = α
QAct
Kct
, wct = (1− α) Q
A
ct
Hc
, (9)
Et [Kct+1] = Ict = Bct = scQ
A
ct, (10)
where α ≡ θαK + (1− θ)αH and sc ≡ (1− α)Sc. As equations (8)-(10) show,
c’s economy in autarky behaves like a Solow model with investment shocks.
10This assumption is not crucial but it greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis.
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2.2 Commodity Trade and the Patterns of Specialisation
2.2.1 Factor Price Equalisation and the World Economy
I introduce commodity trade between different regions by assuming that inter-
mediate goods are perfectly tradable, while factors and final goods cannot be
traded. For now − in common with most trade models − I do not allow agents
in c to trade assets with residents of other regions, so that domestic capital in-
vestments remain their only means of transferring consumption to the future.
One way to rationalise the absence of international asset trades could be the
prevalence of transaction costs which are sufficiently large to make such trades
undesirable from the agents’ perspective.
The source of gains from commodity trade in the present model are dif-
ferences in factor proportions. Given world prices, countries choose the pro-
duction vector {QcKt, QcHt} which best suits their relative endowment of pro-
duction factors. By the force of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, this leads K-
abundant regions to specialise in, and export, the K−intensive intermediate
and import the H-intensive intermediate, while H-abundant regions will ex-
hibit the reverse pattern of specialisation.
It is a well-established feature of models of factor-proportions trade that
trade in derivative commodities may equalise the return to production factors
across regions even when factors themselves cannot move to exploit potential
return differentials. This is referred to as the Factor Price Equalisation (FPE)
theorem. In the present setting, FPE requires that
αH
1− αH
(1− α)
α
Kt
Ht
≤ Kct
Hc
≤ αK
1− αK
(1− α)
α
Kt
Ht
∀ c, (11)
where Kt and Ht denote the world stock of physical and human capital, re-
spectively.11 Condition (11) states that, given αK and αH , FPE will arise as
long as regions’ relative factor endowments are not too extreme compared to
the world ratio of physical to human capital. I will assume, crucially, that (11)
applies throughout.12
11See Ventura (2005) for a comprehensive discussion of the necessary conditions for FPE
to arise as a result of trade in commodities.
12While the possibility of trade-induced factor price equalisation is a feature of many
trade models, the question whether it is also a feature of reality has not yet been answered
conclusively. Trefler (1993) documents the empirical validity of a conditional version of the
FPE theorem. More recently, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that, despite large differences
in capital-labour ratios and the absence of large capital flows from capital-abundant to
capital-scarce regions, the marginal product of capital does not appear to differ greatly
across countries.
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Assuming that (11) holds implies
rct = rt, wct = wt ∀ c.
Moreover, since intermediate goods can be traded freely,
Pcjt = Pjt ∀ c and j ∈ {K,H} ,
from which
Pct = Pt ∀ c.
Imposing the normalisation Pt = 1 and dropping the subscript c for all
world variables,
Qt = K
α
t H
1−α, (12)
rt = α
Qt
Kt
, wt = (1− α) Qt
H
, (13)
Kt+1 =
C∑
c=1
Act+1Ict =
C∑
c=1
Act+1scQct. (14)
The aggregate world economy behaves just like a larger version of the autarkic
region described in Section 2.1.4, while the output of each region c is now
described by
Qct =
[
α
Kct
Kt
+ (1− α) Hc
H
]
Qt. (15)
2.2.2 Specialisation
Define Mcit as the value of region c’s net imports of the i-intermediate. Since
trade is balanced
McHt =
α (1− α)
αK − αH
(
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
)
Qt = −McKt. (16)
So long as Kct/Kt − Hc/H > 0, c will be a net importer of the H-good and
a net exporter of the K-good. If Kct/Kt −Hc/H < 0, the reverse will be the
case. An increase in |Kct/Kt −Hc/H| thus raises c’s trade with the rest of
the world, and we may take this term as a measure of c’s specialisation. It is
easy to show that, while (11) remains satisfied, an increase in |Kct/Kt −Hc/H|
causes c to increase more than proportionally its production of the intermediate
good of which it is a net exporter, and to reduce its production of the other
intermediate good. The region absorbs its growing factor abundance by means
of structural transformation. This is the classic Rybczynski theorem.
Traditional trade theory takes the distribution of Kct and Hc as given and
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analyses the resulting patterns of specialisation. I shall go one step further by
analysing the deeper causes of specialisation which underlie the observed dis-
tribution of factor endowments. Two extreme cases are of particular interest.
Let s =
∑
c scHc/H be the world savings rate. Assume sc ≈ s and σc is
large for all c. Then, ∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ ≈
∣∣∣∣∣ Act∑
cAct
Hc
H
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ HcH . (17)
Under this assumption, the pattern of specialisation is determined purely
by luck. Regions which receive large positive investment shocks relative to
the world average will be capital-abundant, while regions which receive small
shocks will be capital-scarce. Moreover, as the patterns of specialisation are
essentially random, regions which specialise in capital-intensive exports in one
generation may be specialised in labour-intensive exports in the next. Clearly
this view of the fundamental forces behind trade specialisation is of limited
empirical appeal. I shall therefore focus on an alternative case.
Assume that sc differs across countries and σc ≈ 0. Then,∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ ≈ ∣∣∣scs − 1∣∣∣ HcH . (18)
Under this assumption, the pattern of specialisation is determined by savings
behaviour. High-savings region will accumulate large capital stocks relative to
low-savings regions and specialise in capital-intensive products. Low-savings
regions will specialise in labour-intensive products. This is the view of the
fundamental causes of differences in capital-labour ratios implicit in most tra-
ditional models of factor-proportions trade. In Section 2.4, I will show that it
crucially depends on the assumption of financial autarky. Once international
asset trades are feasible, the determinants of specialisation are fundamentally
altered.
2.2.3 World Trade
While the model predicts region c’s net imports and net exports, gross trade
flows are indeterminate. To pin down the latter, I assume that positive but
infinitesimal transport costs cause agents to minimise gross trade flows - which
are then equal to net flows - and I will refer to “imports/exports” and “net
imports/exports” interchangeably from now on.
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Based on (16), the traded share of world output is∑
c (|McKt|+ |McHt|)
2Qt
=
α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ . (19)
Equation (19) will be crucial in the remainder of the paper. It shows that the
bigger the differences between regional shares in the world stocks of physical
and human capital and, hence, the greater the extent of countries’ specialisa-
tion in equilibrium, the larger will be the overall volume of trade.
2.3 Arrival of a New Country
2.3.1 A Labour-Abundant Country Appears
Imagine that at time t country New is discovered and all old regions begin to
trade intermediate goods with New.13 I assume that (11) still holds after the
arrival of the new country and define
HNew ≡ xHH, (20)
KNew,t ≡ xKKt, (21)
whereH andKt continue to denote, respectively, the world stock of human and
physical capital prior to New’s arrival. The parameters xH and xK thus denote
the percentage growth in the world human and physical capital resulting from
the integration of New into the world economy.
Let C denote the set of regions before New’s arrival. I define CH as
the group of regions specialised in the H-intensive and CK as the group of
regions specialised the K-intensive intermediate good before New appeared,
with CH ∪ CK = C and CH ∩ CK = .
Note that
KNew,t
HNew
=
1 + xK
1 + xH
Kt
H
− xH − xK
xH (1 + xH)
Kt
H
,
so New is labour-abundant if xH > xK and capital-abundant if xK > xH . I
will assume xH > xK in the following.
13It would be analytically equivalent but algebraically more cumbersome to assume that
New, instead of being “discovered”, was a previously autarkic region which opens up to
trade at t.
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2.3.2 Impact on Specialisation
The discovery of New has an impact on world trading patterns. New itself will
be an importer of the K-intermediate and an exporter of the H-intermediate,
MNew,Kt
Qt
=
α (1− α)
αK − αH
xH − xK
(1 + xH) (1 + xK)
= −MNew,Ht
Qt
, (22)
which follows from the assumption that xH > xK . Meanwhile for c ∈ CH ,
McKt
Qt
=
α (1− α)
αK − αH
[(
Hc
H
− Kct
Kt
)
1
1 + xH
− Kct
Kt
xH − xK
(1 + xH) (1 + xK)
]
= −McHt
Qt
(23)
and for c ∈ CK ,
McHt
Qt
=
α (1− α)
αK − αH
[(
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
)
1
1 + xH
+
Kct
Kt
xH − xK
(1 + xH) (1 + xK)
]
= −McKt
Qt
.
(24)
As a comparison between (16) and equations (23) and (24) shows, the
arrival of a new labour-abundant country unambiguously reduces the imports
and exports of previously labour-abundant regions relative to world GDP,
but may increase or decrease the imports and exports of previously capital-
abundant regions. This is due to the simultaneous impact of two effects. On
the one hand, New’s arrival increases world GDP which, holding everything
else constant, reduces the value of all regions’ trade flows relative to world
output. On the other hand, the opening up of New increases the supply of
H-intermediates relative to K-intermediates, causing K-exporters to increase
their production and exports of the K-good as well as their imports of the
H-good while H-exporters do the reverse.
New’s integration into the global economy thus increases the extent of spe-
cialisation and trade openness among K-exporters, but reduces specialisation
and trade openness among H-exporters. The next section examines the overall
impact on world trade.
2.3.3 Impact on World Trade
To simplify matters, let us assume that the arrival of New does not cause a
previous net exporter of the H-intermediate to become a net exporter of the
K-intermediate. Then the change in the traded share of world output due to
New’s appearance is given by
4
∑
c (|McKt|+ |McHt|)
2Qt
=
16
α (1− α)
αK − αH
{
2
xH − xK
(1 + xH) (1 + xK)
∑
c∈CK
Kct
Kt
− xH
1 + xH
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣
}
. (25)
Note that if New is very labour-abundant and the differences between
countries in C are small − so that there is little trade before the discovery of
New −, its arrival will increase world trade. Note further that the increase in
world trade will be larger, the larger the share of world capital located in the
group of capital-abundant regions.
An increase in capital accumulation in capital-abundant regions relative to
capital-scarce regions would thus amplify the impact of the opening-up of a
labour-abundant country. In the next section I show that there exist conditions
under which financial globalisation will have precisely this effect.
2.4 Financial Globalisation
2.4.1 International Asset Trade and Country Risk
Section 2.2.3 illustrates that, if investment risk is small, savings behaviour
is the main determinant of capital accumulation and export specialisation in
financial autarky. Yet in the face of the large and rising volume of international
capital flows observed during the last three decades, this view of the causes of
specialisation appears increasingly dated. The panel regressions in Appendix
A2 suggest that the savings retention coefficient among the group of the largest
economies was as low as 0.4 in in the period 1980-2007, and that perceptions
of country risk were a potentially important source of countries’ ability to
attract investment finance in increasingly global capital markets. In the light
of this, I now analyse the determinants of capital-labour ratios − and the
resulting patterns of specialisation − when domestic savings no longer need
to be invested exclusively in domestic assets, and country-specific investment
risk provides a strong motive for international risk sharing.
The most widespread view of the motive for international capital flows,
based on macroeconomic models with a single tradable good, emphasises di-
minishing returns to capital. In this view, the return to capital investments
is generally higher in regions with low capital-labour ratios, and capital flows
from capital-abundant to capital-scarce regions in search of these higher re-
turns. Unless regional factor productivities are strongly positively correlated
with region’s autarky capital stocks, the effect of international capital flows
should be to reduce the dispersion of world capital-labour ratios. While this
explanation for cross-border capital movements has considerable theoretical
appeal, it has been known since at least Lucas (1990) that it is at odds with
the empirical pattern of international financial flows.
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The model outlined above provides an explanation why local diminish-
ing returns to capital may be weak in open economies, even if the marginal
product of capital in aggregate production is declining in the installed capital
stock: once capital is installed in a given location, the possibility of trading
derivative commodities in international goods markets may substitute for cap-
ital movements in equalising the marginal product of capital across different
regions. With local diminishing returns thus out of the picture, the following
will stress a different motive for international asset trade: the desire to share
country-specific risk.
So far, it has been assumed that domestic capital constitutes the only
store of value for the patient young in region c. This has made it unneces-
sary to specify how such agents might allocate their funds between competing
investment opportunities. In this section I permit agents to trade freely in
state-contingent assets across borders which allows them, indirectly, to access
the investment technologies of different regions. In doing so, I assume that the
patient young choose mean-variance efficient asset portfolios,14 maximising
Et (Ct+1)− 1
2
γV ar (Ct+1) with γ ≥ 0, (26)
where γ is the parameter of relative risk aversion.
Suppose the number of countries, C, is large. Then, since country risk is
perfectly idiosyncratic,
Kt+1 = It = Bt = sQt,
i.e. the evolution of the world capital stock is deterministic. This implies that
rt+1 = α
(
H
Bt
)1−α
,
so that all uncertainty about the return to investment in a given c arises from
realisation of the local investment shock.
Young residents of region c in period t are willing to supply a state-
contingent asset that promises rt+1Act+1 units of consumption in t + 1 at
price 1 perfectly elastically. The reason is that they can hedge any amount of
such claims by investing in a corresponding amount of domestic capital, also
at price 1. It is easy to show that the possibility of buying and selling C of
these regional assets exhausts all desirable asset trades in the world economy
described here. Let φcc′ denote the share of savings of the patient young in c
14This behavioural assumption is common in modern finance, and provides a good approx-
imation to expected utility maximisation if the distribution of asset returns is characterised
well by its first two moments.
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invested in assets of region c′. The patient young solve:
max
{φcc′}Cc′=1
Et
(
rt+1Bct
∑
c′
Ac′t+1φ
c
c′
)
− 1
2
γV ar
(
rt+1Bct
∑
c′
Ac′t+1φ
c
c′
)
= rt+1Bct − 1
2
γ (rt+1Bct)
2
∑
c′
(σc′φ
c
c′)
2
s.t. ∑
c′
φcc′ = 1.
Note that, while the final consumption good itself cannot be traded across re-
gions, residents of region c can fulfil a promise to supply 1 unit of consumption
to foreigners in a given state by supplying the necessary quantities of perfectly
tradable intermediate goods to assemble 1 unit of final good in that state. This
may require within-period factor-proportions trade with a third party before
the required bundle of K- and H-good can be shipped to the final claimant.
2.4.2 The Pattern of International Capital Flows
Since the patient young in all regions face the same optimisation problem, it
follows that
Ict
Bt
= φc =
1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
. (27)
Investment in region c thus depends negatively on c’s country risk relative to
a measure of world risk. In the limiting case in which σc → 0 ∀ c, investment
patterns are once again indeterminate if international trade in both goods
and assets is feasible. Therefore, one way of interpreting the indeterminacy
result of Mundell (1957) is as a special case of the model in which country risk
is absent. This finding is more general than the specific choice of objective
function and the assumed return distribution would seem to suggest: given
identical return expectations, any risk-averse agent will favour safer over riskier
assets in their portfolio, but will invest in assets of different risk classes if this
provides hedging benefits.
Region c is a net recipient of international capital flows if
1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
>
sc
Hc
H
s
. (28)
Let us consider the example of a world in which factor-proportions trade is
prevalent, regional savings rates are similar but the safest regions are small
(in terms of Hc/H). In this world, financial globalisation should be accom-
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panied by capital flows from capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries as
well as large and persistent net foreign asset positions. As Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2008) have shown, among others, this is fairly accurate de-
scription of the recent pattern of international capital flows. In Section 3.2
I will assess whether my model can deliver predictions about international
investment patterns which are consistent with the data.
2.4.3 Impact on Specialisation
Consider now the following thought experiment. Suppose that for all t < t¯
regions had been able to trade in intermediate varieties but not in final goods
or factors, nor in financial assets. This is the world described in Section 2.2.
Assume now that in period t¯ all costs and frictions impeding international
financial transactions disappear and global asset markets become fully inte-
grated.
The feasibility of international asset trade implies that commodity trade
no longer needs to be balanced for any c or t ≥ t¯. Defining
−NXct ≡McHt +McKt (29)
and noting that
Qct = Cct + Ict +NXct, (30)
it can be shown that for all t ≥ t¯
|McKt|+ |McHt|
2Qt
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣α(1− α)αK − αH
(
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
)
+ θ
NXct
Qt
∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣α(1− α)αK − αH
(
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
)
− (1− θ) NXct
Qt
∣∣∣∣ . (31)
Equation (31) highlights that the presence of trade imbalances may obscure
or reinforce the relationship between a region’s true comparative advantage
and its export-import patterns, depending on the values of θ andNXct. By way
of example, consider the case of a capital-abundant region (Kct/Kt > Hc/H)
which is a large net importer (NXct < 0) and let θ be close to 1. While the
region will be specialised in producing the K-intermediate, its net imports -
due, for example, to net capital inflows - cause it to consume disproportionately
more of the K-good. This reduces its exports in the K-sector while leaving
its H-imports almost unchanged, and it reduces the sum of its exports and
import overall.
The reverse would be true i) if c were a net exporter (NXct > 0) or ii)
if θ were close to 0. In these cases, the presence of a trade imbalance would
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increase the region’s trade with the rest of the world by i) increasing the
region’s exports of the good in which it has a comparative advantage or ii)
increasing the region’s imports of the good in which it has a comparative
disadvantage.
Irrespective of the impact of trade imbalances on export-import patterns,
capital-abundant regions will continue to be specialised in the production ofK-
intermediates and labour-abundant regions in the production ofH-intermediates.
Yet the determinants of capital-abundance or -scarcity are changed by the na-
ture of international asset trades: assuming, once again, that the absolute size
of investment shocks is small (σc ≈ 0), then
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
≈ 1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
− Hc
H
. (32)
With factor-price equalising commodity trade and fully integrated interna-
tional asset markets, savings rates are no longer the most relevant underlying
cause of specialisation. Instead, relatively safe regions receive the largest share
of capital investments out of the sum of world savings and, as a result, these
regions will specialise in capital-intensive products.
2.4.4 Impact on World Trade
Note that if θ = 1/2 and
|NXct| < 2α (1− α)
αK − αH
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣Qt ∀ c, (33)
equation (31) reduces to (19), i.e. regardless of whether trade imbalances are
present or not, the traded share of world output is the same as if trade were
balanced. The reason is simple: as long as trade imbalances are not so large as
to turn a country into a net importer or exporter of both intermediate goods
− that is, as long as (33) is satisfied − a trade surplus with θ = 1/2 increases
a country’s exports by the same amount by which it reduces its imports (and
a trade deficit reduces its exports by the same amount by which it increases
its imports), leaving the sum of its exports and imports unchanged. In the
aggregate, therefore, the traded share of world output is unaffected by trade
imbalances. I will first analyse this special, but familiar case, then proceed to
the more general case in which θ 6= 1/2.
Assume θ = 1/2 and (33) holds. It is now straightforward to determine the
conditions under which this sudden shift from financial autarky to financial
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globalisation causes countries to become more specialised overall, namely:
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
Hcσ
2
c
H
∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
∑
c
∣∣∣sc
s
− 1
∣∣∣ . (34)
Financial globalisation increases specialisation if capital flows exacerbate any
mismatch between human and physical capital that existed under autarky, i.e.
if differences in regional savings rates are small (sc ≈ s ∀ c), and country risk
is positively correlated with country size (Cov
{
σc,
Hc
H
}
> 0). The result is an
increase in world trade.
Suppose now that θ 6= 1/2. The impact of financial globalisation on regions’
specialisation patterns will be as in the previous case. Yet even if (34) is
true, whether and by how much financial globalisation increases world trade
relative to financial autarky depends on the value of θ and the incidence of
trade surpluses and deficits. Without loss of generality, consider the case
in which θ < 1/2. If deficit countries are capital-abundant on average and
surplus countries are labour-abundant, trade imbalances will cause financial
globalisation to increase global trade more than if θ = 1/2. If deficit countries
are labour-abundant on average and surplus countries are capital-abundant,
financial globalisation increases global trade less.
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3 Calibrations
In this section I assess the extent to which factor-proportions differences can
explain the growth in world trade between 1980 and 2007 by taking the model
developed above to the data. In accordance with conventional wisdom my
model, with its exclusive focus on factor-proportions differences, cannot ex-
plain the overall level of world trade (see, for example, Helpman, 1987). How-
ever, I show that the evolution of relative factor endowments among the largest
trading economies can explain 50-80% of the growth in world trade over the
last three decades.
Having identified changes in relative factor abundance as a significant driv-
ing force behind the expansion of global trade, I use the model to examine the
importance of two contributing factors: the emergence of China and the oc-
currence of financial globalisation. Financial globalisation, by giving rise to
net capital flows from capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries, has exac-
erbated the dispersion of world capital-labour ratios. At the same time, the
opening of China − a large and extremely capital-scarce economy − has in-
creased the heterogeneity of factor endowments among the largest, most open
countries. My calibrations suggest that financial globalisation accounts for 10-
18% of the trade growth predicted by my model, with the remainder explained
by the rise of China. I also demonstrate that their simultaneous occurrence
has amplified the overall effect of both on relative factor endowments.
In the light of the observation that financial globalisation has increased
factor-proportions differences, contrary to the predictions of conventional mod-
els, I examine in Section 3.2 whether my model predicts international invest-
ment patterns which are consistent with the data. I compare the variance
of investment shocks implied by my calibrations with empirical measures of
country risk and find that the country-risk profiles implied by the frictionless
model of international asset trade set out in Section 2.4 are a poor match for
the data. Introducing a small financial friction, however, allows me to match
observed country-risk profiles and results in plausible predictions about coun-
tries’ relative financial openness. I then illustrate the long-run growth of trade
under several different hypothetical paths for the average financial friction.
3.1 The Growth in World Trade, 1980-2007
3.1.1 Basic Data and Parameterisation
The model of Section 2 is characterised by an overlapping-generations structure
and assumes full depreciation of capital between periods. To remain true to
the spirit of the theory, I treat the years 1980 and 2007 as consecutive periods
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of this model.
I use data for the 28 largest economies between 1980 and 2007. Together
these countries accounted for 90% of world GDP in 2007. Their stocks of
human and physical capital in 1980 and 2007 are estimated in accordance
with the methodology explained in Appendix A1, which also provides a full
list of countries’ estimated shares in the stock of world production factors.
Data on aggregate trade flows and country GDP is taken from the World Trade
Organisation’s database and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
respectively.
I initially let θ = 0.5 and note that in the data
|NXct| < 2α (1− α)
αK − αH
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HctHt
∣∣∣∣Qt
for all countries and t = 1980, 2007. It follows from the discussion in Section
2.4.4 that the traded share of world output in 1980 and 2007, respectively, is
given by∑
c (|McK1980|+ |McH1980|)
2Q1980
=
α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c
∣∣∣∣sc1980s1980 Hc1980H1980 − Hc1980H1980
∣∣∣∣ , (35)
∑
c (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2Q2007
=
α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1σ2c
(∑
c
1
σ2c
)−1
− Hc2007
H2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (36)
where I assume that financial globalisation occurred some time between these
two years.15 Equations (35) and (36) highlight the remaining data and param-
eters required to calibrate the model.
I take {Hc1980/H1980}c and {Hc2007/K2007}c from the data described in Ap-
pendix A1 and choose {sc1980}c to let {sc1980Hc1980/s1980H1980}c match my esti-
mate of {Kc1980/K1980}c. I use {σ2c}c to match the estimated {Kc2007/K2007}c.
Note that the implied country variances merely rationalise my empirical es-
timates of countries’ capital stocks in 2007 which, together with my human
capital estimates, determine the volume of trade from equation (36). Whether
these variances are, in fact, realistic is irrelevant for the model’s predictions
about the growth in world trade. Nevertheless, the model-implied country risk
provides a consistency check for the determinants of international capital flows
emphasised in Section 2.4. For this reason, I subject them to a more rigorous
empirical assessment in Section 3.2.
As per convention, I set α = 0.33. Together with my assumption about
the value of θ this implies αK = 0.67 − αH and I choose αK = 0.67, αH = 0.
15This assumption is innocuous as the absolute magnitude of international financial flows
between 1950 and 1980 was sufficiently small to have had almost no perceptible impact on
the patterns of capital accumulation across countries.
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The latter has two advantages: given the remaining parameter choices, it
maximises the set of capital-labour ratios for which equation (11) is satisfied
and minimises the volume of factor-proportions trade for given differences in
capital-labour ratios.16 Put differently, the model will yield the most conser-
vative predictions regarding the contribution of factor-proportions differences
to overall world trade. I experiment with different values for θ, αK and αH in
subsequent sections.
The WTO data puts the traded share of world output at 15.7% in 1980
and 22.2% in 2007. This implies an expansion of the traded share of world
GDP by 6.5 percentage points.
3.1.2 Modelling Trade Openness
By using equation (35) and (36), I make the implicit assumption that all
countries in my sample are completely open to trade with the rest of the world.
While this may be a reasonable description of the set of advanced economies in
1980, the extent to which it applies to the developing countries in my sample
is questionable. Since countries in the latter group are without exception
characterised by relative capital scarcity, my assumptions about their trade
openness are likely to affect the model’s predictions about the volume and
growth in world trade crucially.
As a first pass at addressing this issue, I divide my set of 28 large economies
into two groups, separating all open economies in 1980 from largely closed
economies. To determine openness, I employ the widely used index of trade
openness by Sachs and Warner (1995), revised and updated by Wacziarg
and Horn-Welch (2003). The index groups countries into open and closed
economies based on information about tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
Its realisations for my sample countries in 1980 are reported in appendix A1.
I then assume that closed economies are autarkic as described in Section 2.1.4.
Open economies are completely open to trade as in Sections 2.2 to 2.4. This
results in an augmented version of equations (35) and (36):
∑
c∈C (|McK1980|+ |McH1980|)
2
(
Q1980 +QA1980
) = α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣sc1980s1980 Hc1980H1980 − Hc1980H1980
∣∣∣∣ Q1980Q1980 +QA1980 ,
(35’)∑
c∈C (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2
(
Q2007 +QA2007
) = α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1σ2c
(∑
c
1
σ2c
)−1
− Hc2007
H2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Q2007Q2007 +QA2007 ,
(36’)
16Note that equation (11) holds and, hence, factor-price equalisation is predicted by the
model for all parametrisation of αK and αH used in this section.
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where QAt =
∑
c∈CA Q
A
ct, and C is the set of open and CA the set of autarkic
regions.
China constitutes a special case among my sample countries. The period of
analysis coincides with the implementation of China’s “reform and opening up”
which began in the late 1970s. While the significance of China’s integration
into the global economy is widely acknowledged, it is difficult to overstate the
momentous impact of incorporating China into any factor-proportions-based
view of international commodity trade. With an estimated 37% of the world’s
human capital and a capital stock per effective worker of approximately 10,000
GK$ (both as of 2007), it is at once the largest economy in population terms
by far, and one of the most capital-scarce.
Figure 3.1: Country Shares of World Trade, 1980-2007
Figure 3.1 illustrates the rise of China by plotting the shares in world trade
of the largest trading economies over the period 1980-2007. The figure shows
that the relative size of these shares for all countries except China has been
remarkably constant. The Chinese share in world trade, however, surged from
under 1% to nearly 11% of world trade in the 27-year period, and the sum of
Chinese exports and imports amounted to 0.68 of the sum of U.S. exports and
imports by 2007.
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Horn-Welch (2003) classify
China as closed in 1980, and I follow their lead in grouping it among the set
of autarkic regions in 1980. As Figure 3.1 indicates, assuming that China
remained closed over the last three decades would cause the model to underes-
timate significantly the potential for factor-proportions trade in 2007. At the
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same time, imposing a complete opening up of China by 2007 would perhaps
overstate the extent of China’s contemporary trade openness and overestimate
the current volume and, hence, the recent growth of factor-proportions trade.
I attempt to balance these concerns by allowing for a partial opening of
China. In particular, I assume that China consists of a continuum of re-
gions, all of which share the country’s aggregate capital-labour ratio. A share
TChina,2007 of these regions is completely open to trade in 2007, the remaining
share 1 − TChina,2007 is completely autarkic.17 I then calibrate TChina,2007 to
ensure that Chinese trade matches the observed share of Chinese exports and
imports in world GDP in 2007, which is 2.4% according to WTO data.
3.1.3 Baseline Results
As a starting point, I calibrate the model using the data and parameters
described in Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. The results are shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Basic Calibration
The model predicts an expansion of the traded share of world output by
3.4 percentage points, just over half of the increase observed in the data. By
contrast, its predictions regarding the overall level of world trade in 1980 and
2007 − which are 7.3% and 10.7% of global output, respectively − fall short
17Assuming that globalisation proceeds as an increase in the share of a country’s “glob-
alised” regions has the advantage of being highly tractable analytically. In particular, the
share of globalised regions will have the same capital-labour ratio as the country as a whole
and will satisfy equation (11) so long as the country’s aggregate factor proportions do.
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of their empirical counterparts in both years. This accords with the view that
factor-proportions-based models of international trade are of limited use in
explaining the overall volume of trade. Yet, as evidenced by the above, such
models are clearly capable of explaining a significant portion of the recent
growth in world trade. In addition to this, my calibrated model predicts the
overall level of trade by capital-scarce countries in 2007 well - 4.9% in the
model as compared to 5.3% in the data - and matches the ratio of Chinese to
U.S. trade in 2007 almost perfectly - 0.68 in the model as compared to 0.69 in
the data.
Next I assess the contribution of financial globalisation and the opening
of China to the growth in world trade as predicted by the model. Absent
financial globalisation,
∑
c∈C (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2
(
Q2007 +QA2007
) = α(1− α)
αK − αH
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣sc2007s2007 Hc2007H2007 − Hc2007H2007
∣∣∣∣ Q2007Q2007 +QA2007 ,
(37)
and to calibrate {sc2007}c I construct a set of counterfactual capital stocks for
the year 2007,
{
Kˆc2007/K2007
}
c
, using the perpetual inventory method but
letting domestic investment equal domestic savings. A detailed description of
the construction of these counterfactual capital stocks, and countries’ coun-
terfactual shares in the world stock of capital are provided in Appendix A1.
Using equations (35’) and (37) I find that the occurrence of financial globalisa-
tion alongside the opening of China increased world trade as a share of world
output by about 0.5 percentage points over and above the increase that would
have occurred in continued financial autarky - enough to push the portion of
world trade growth explained by the model above the 50%-mark.
Assuming financial globalisation but letting TChina,2007 = TChina,1980 = 0,
the model predicts a decrease in the traded share of world output by 0.5 per-
centage points. This suggests, on the one hand, that the emergence of China
accounts for most of the increase in world trade explained by the model and,
on the other, that in the absence of China’s opening the relative factor endow-
ments of open economies would have become more homogeneous, reducing
the motive for factor proportions trade. Had China remained autarkic and
financial globalisation not occurred, countries’ factor proportions would have
become even more similar, and factor-proportions trade would have decline
by 0.7 percentage points of world GDP. However, I will show in Section 3.1.4
that the finding of a decline in factor-proportions trade without China and
financial globalisation is sensitive to the assumptions about the relative trade
openness of countries in 1980 and 2007.
According to the model, China’s opening under the assumption of financial
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autarky would have increased the traded share of world output by 3 percent-
age points, while it would have decreased by 0.5 percentage points if financial
globalisation had occurred but China had remained closed. Close to 30% of
the predicted 3.5 percentage-point rise in the traded share of world GDP is
thus due to the interaction between these two events. The size of this in-
teractive effect should not come as a surprise. As previously noted, capital
flows have raised the capital-labour ratios of some of the world’s most capital-
abundant economies. If, in addition, the most recent wave of globalisation has
integrated regions with below-average capital-labour ratios into global com-
modity markets − which is clearly true in the case of China − this ought
to have exacerbated the effect of increased capital abundance among open,
capital-importing countries in accordance with equation (25).
Table 3: Calibration Results
In the following sections, I explore a number of alternative calibrations to
verify the robustness of the findings presented above. For ease of compari-
son, all calibration results are summarised in Table 3. The robustness checks
reaffirm the broad message of the baseline calibration. A factor-proportions
model of international commodity trade which accounts for the emergence of
China as a major trading country can explain most of the growth in world
trade over the last three decades. The majority of the predicted trade growth
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is due to the opening of China, with a smaller but significantly sized share
due to financial globalisation and the resulting pattern of South-North capital
flows.
3.1.4 Alternative Assumptions About Trade Openness
To check whether my findings are sensitive to the use of the Sachs-Warner
index to group the world into autarkic and open regions, I use the Heritage
Foundation’s Trade Freedom index as an alternative measure of initial trade
openness.18 Similarly to the case of China described in Section 3.1.2, I divide
each country into a time-invariant share Tc of open and 1−Tc autarkic regions
based on its Trade Freedom score. The fact that the index ranges from 0 to
1 facilitates this calibration. I treat China as before, setting TChina,1980 = 0
and TChina,2007 sufficiently high to match the ratio of Chinese trade to world
output in 2007.
Calibrating the model in this manner, I find that it predicts higher vol-
umes of factor-proportions trade − namely 9.2% in 1980 and 13.6% in 2007
− and explains 68% of the growth in world trade since 1980. Assuming away
financial globalisation reduces the explanatory power of the model by 10%,
while assuming away the opening of China reduces it by 84%. However, even
in the absence of both the model now predicts a modest increase in trade,
suggesting that the evolution of relative factor endowments in the assumed
absence of China’s opening and financial globalisation depends on the precise
composition of the (remaining) group of trading economies.
So far, I have kept trade openness in all countries except China constant
throughout. I now relax this assumption. Once again, I use the Sachs-Warner
index to determine whether or not a country is open in 1980, as in Section
3.1.2. I set TChina,1980 = 0 and TChina,2007 to match Chinese trade over world
GDP in 2007. Additionally, I allow for a uniform opening of all countries which
are classified as closed in 1980 and set their openness parameter in 2007 so as
to match their combined level of trade relative to world output in that year.
The model now explains a remarkable 86% of the growth in world trade
since 1980. The comparative importance of financial globalisation for the
explained increase remains unchanged but, intuitively, the role of China −
which is still significant − is somewhat lessened by the assumed opening up
of a sizable group of capital-scarce economies.
18As the Trade Freedom index was first published in 1995, I use the Heritage Founda-
tion’s methodology to extend it back to 1980 using data on tariff rates from Clemens and
Williamson (2004) and non-tariff barriers from Wacziarg and Horn-Welch (2003). I am
grateful to Michael Clemens and Jeffrey Williamson for kindly sharing their data.
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3.1.5 The Role of Trade Imbalances
So far I have arbitrarily let θ = 0.5. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, this as-
sumption is convenient because it ensures that sufficiently small trade imbal-
ances will manifest themselves in the form of a reduction in exports and an
equally-sized increase in imports, the combined effect of which leaves the sum
of exports and imports unchanged. This allowed me to disregard the role of
trade imbalances in determining the overall volume and growth of world trade
up to now.
In this section I analyse the effect of choosing θ 6= 0.5. To show the impact
of trade imbalances in the calibration setting I employed so far, I retain the
assumption that αK − αH = 0.67 and α = 0.33. Hence, θ = 0.5 − 1.5αH . I
choose αH = 0.1, the largest value for which equation (11) remains satisfied
for all countries and years, yielding θ = 0.35.
Given θ 6= 0.5, equation (36’) is replaced by∑
c∈C (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2
(
Q2007 +QA2007
) = 1
2
Q2007
Q2007 +QA2007
×
∑
c∈C

∣∣∣∣∣∣ α(1− α)αK − αH
 1
σ2c
(∑
c
1
σ2c
)−1
− Hc2007
H2007
+ θNXc2007
Q2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ (38)∣∣∣∣∣∣ α(1− α)αK − αH
 1
σ2c
(∑
c
1
σ2c
)−1
− Hc2007
H2007
− (1− θ) NXc2007
Q2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ,
while equations (35’) and (37) remain unchanged because trade is necessarily
balanced in financial autarky. I select {NXc2007}c to match countries empirical
trade balances, using WTO data.
A comparison between rows 1 and 4 of Table 3 shows that allowing for
trade imbalances with θ = 0.35 increases the share of world trade growth
explained by the calibrated model by almost 4 percentage points. This, in turn,
gives greater importance to financial globalisation as a source of trade growth
between 1980 and 2007. The reason for this is as follows. With θ < 0.5, a
trade deficit increases domestic demand for capital-intensive products less than
for labour-intensive products. Conversely, a trade surplus decreases domestic
demand for capital-intensive products less than for labour-intensive products.
Consequently, if deficit countries are − on average − capital-abundant and
surplus countries labour-abundant, trade imbalances will increase global trade.
The increase in trade growth predicted by the model is thus largely due to the
substantial trade deficit of the United States in 2007 (amounting to 1.9% of
world GDP) and the sizable trade surplus of China (about 0.6% of world
GDP). If, on the other hand, θ > 0.5 had been chosen, the pattern would be
reversed: the model would predict the observed pattern of trade surpluses and
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deficits to reduce global trade, and it would predict a smaller increase in global
trade.
I do not explore the latter case here because values of θ significantly above
0.5 are incompatible with the requirement that (11) holds for all countries.
Ultimately, the appropriate value of θ depends on the extent to which trade
imbalances affect the patterns of comparative advantage and the volume of
trade in practice − an empirical question which is beyond the scope of this
paper. Choosing θ = 0.5 enables me not to take a stance either way while this
issue remains unresolved.
3.1.6 The Role of Industry Capital Intensities
While the difference between the capital intensities of the K- and the H-
intermediate is a crucial determinant of the volume of trade generated by the
model, it is difficult to know how to calibrate αK and αH appropriately to
capture the real-life technological differences between more and less capital-
intensive industries. An important question, therefore, is whether the precise
choice of parameters matters for the model’s prediction regarding world trade
growth. As it turns out, the nature of my calibration strategy implies that
this is not the case.
As an example, I choose αK = 1, αH = 0. Under this assumption, equation
(11) holds for all country irrespective of the difference between their capital-
labour ratio and the world’s. To ensure that α = 0.33 I now require θ = 0.33,
which means that trade imbalances will play the same role as in Section 3.1.5.
All other aspects of the calibration exercise remain the same as in the baseline
case. As rows 4 and 5 of Table 3 illustrate, the main difference between this
calibration and the one in Section 3.1.5 is the difference between the capital
intensities of the K- and H-intermediate. However, the results are strikingly
similar, despite the model’s relatively lower propensity to generate trade from
factor-proportions differences in row 5.
The reason for this is the way in which I model the opening up of China.
Precisely because αK − αH = 1 results in a lower propensity of the model
to generate trade volume, it requires TChina,2007 to be larger − i.e. China to
have become more open − in order to match the level of Chinese exports and
imports in 2007. The implied additional opening of China largely offsets the
model’s reduced ability to generate high volumes of trade. Put differently,
insofar as China’s trade with the rest of the world is mostly due to factor-
proportions differences, the model’s ability to explain the growth in trade is
highly robust to the precise choice of αK and αH .
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3.2 The Pattern of Capital Flows, 1980-2007
3.2.1 Measuring Country Risk
In Section 2.4.1, I show that if international commodity trade equalises factor
returns unimpeded international asset trade will lead to capital investments
in different regions which only reflect their relative country risk, with each
region’s capital stock corresponding to its optimal share in the world’s risk-
minimising portfolio, i.e.
Kct
Kt
=
1
σ2c
(∑
c
1
σ2c
)−1
.
Assuming that financial globalisation occurred some time prior to 2007, I
choose {σ2c}c so as to match {Kc2007/K2007}c throughout Section 3.1. In this
section I will assess the empirical validity of the resulting country risk profiles.
In order to do so, it is first necessary to obtain empirical estimates of
idiosyncratic country risk. I use the relationship between country and world
variables in an integrated world economy established in Sections 2.2 to 2.4.
Specifically, equation (15) can be used to show that
gct − gt ≈ ln
[
α
Kct
Kt
+ (1− α) Hc
H
]
− ln
[
α
Kct−1
Kt−1
+ (1− α) Hc
H
]
, (39)
where gct is the growth rate of c’s GDP and gt is the growth rate of world
GDP. Assuming - as I have throughout - that human capital accumulation
proceeds sluggishly, any short-term fluctuations in gct − gt can be attributed
to country-specific investment shocks. I therefore estimate
gct − gt = αc + β1ct+ β2ct2 + β3ct3 + εct,
and let σˆ2c = V ar(εˆct).19 The growth-rate differential gct − gt is based on
cross-country per-capita GDP data in constant, PPP-adjusted dollars, based
on Heston, Summers and Aten (2009).
The thus derived country variances for the period 1975-2007, {σˆ2c}c, are
strongly and significantly correlated with the average PRSG country risk score
for the same period, with a correlation coefficient of 0.6. The PRSG index,
which is partly based on surveys of perceived country risk among international
investment professionals, was used as a rough measure of country risk in the
19The subsequent findings are not sensitive to the use of a quadratic instead of a cubic
time trend, or to letting σˆ2c equal the variance of the HP-filtered difference between c’s and
the world’s growth rate.
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Figure 3.3: Model-Implied and Empirical Country Risk
Figure 3.4: Model-Implied Financial Openness and Foreign Asset Holdings
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Introduction. It therefore seems safe to argue that my estimated country
variances meaningfully rank countries in terms of their perceived investment
risk.
3.2.2 Model-Implied and Actual Country Risk
Figure 3.3 plots countries’ investment risk as implied by the calibration in
Section 3.1 against the empirical country risk estimated in the previous section.
As is immediately evident, the resulting fit is rather poor: the correlation
between the two variables is a mere 0.1. The model-implied country risk is
close to zero for almost all of the largest economies but assigns unrealistically
high values to many of the small countries.
Upon second examination, this finding should come as no surprise. The
risk-investment regressions referred to in the Introduction (and described in
full in Appendix A2), highlight the continued importance of domestic savings
as a determinant of domestic investment. In accordance with these findings,
economies with a larger pool of domestic savings would be expected to have
larger capital stocks for a given level of country risk. By contrast, in the bench-
mark model in Section 2 domestic savings play no role at all in determining
investment in financially open economies. The model thus attributes the rel-
atively large share of the world capital stock located in the largest economies
to relatively low country risk.
The reason for this prediction of the model is that I have taken an extreme
view of financial globalisation so far: trading in foreign assets is no more costly
than buying or selling domestic assets for agents in a given c. Suppose, instead,
that for each unit of consumption spent by an agent in c on assets from region
c′ 6= c, the agent can only appropriate the returns to 1− τc units of the foreign
asset.20 This additional cost of foreign asset purchases reduces the expected
returns from, and hence the relative attractiveness of, foreign assets and causes
a “home bias” in investment portfolios. As a result, the optimal investment
portfolio is no longer universal, and it can be shown that for agents in region
c
φcc′ = max
 1σ2c′
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1(
1− τc
γσ2c
)
, 0
 ∀ c′ 6= c, (40)
φcc = 1−
∑
c′ 6=c
φcc′ . (41)
If τc ≥ θσ2c , agents in c will choose not to purchase foreign assets at all.
If τc → 0, (40) and (41) approach the optimal frictionless world portfolio
20One could think of τc as a tax on foreign transactions by c’s government, or an agency
or information cost specific to c which is higher for foreign than for domestic investments.
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described by equation (27). An immediate implication of (40) and (41) is that
the higher the average τc (and hence the average φcc), the greater the role for
domestic savings as a determinant of domestic investments.
Introducing a set of financial frictions permits me to set {σ2c}c equal to
{σˆ2c}c and use {τc}c to match {Kc2007/K2007}c. As agents now face a risk-
return trade-off, I need to specify a value for γ, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. In line with the RBC literature, I let γ = 2. I turns out that the
system of 28 equations described by
Kc2007
K2007
=
C∑
c′=1
φc
′
c ({τc}c)
has a unique interior solution in which τc > 0 for all c. The resulting set
of model-implied financial frictions provides an inverse measure of financial
openness for my sample countries: the smaller τc, the more open is c to for-
eign asset trade. This, however, raises the question whether the model’s new
implications for financial openness are more consistent with empirical reality
than the country risk profiles implied by the frictionless model.
Figure 3.4 shows that this is indeed the case. It plots countries’ gross hold-
ings of foreign assets as a percentage of GDP − based on data from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2009) − against the model-implied values of country-specific
foreign investment frictions. The correlation between both is strongly nega-
tive at −0.5, and statistically significant. Countries which face a higher cost
of foreign asset purchases according to the model, do indeed seem to purchase
fewer foreign assets in the data.
In the light of this section, we may interpret countries’ observed shares in
the world capital stock as consistent with an augmented version of the model
from Section 2 in which countries, instead of having moved from financial
autarky to complete financial integration between 1980 and 2007, still face
small frictions in international asset trade. A natural question which arises
from this is how the future evolution of these financial frictions will affect the
long-term pattern of international investment and, hence, the growth in world
trade. The next section makes a first pass at providing an answer.
3.2.3 Long-Run Implications of Financial Globalisation for World
Trade Growth
I start from my baseline calibration in Section 3.1.3, but matching {Kc2007/K2007}c
with my empirical country risk measure and the set of financial frictions, {τc}c,
as described in the previous section. I then treat the long run as a third period
of my model − following t = 1980, 2007 − identical with the most recent year
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in all respects, except the size of the prevailing financial frictions.
In doing so, I make several additional, somewhat heroic assumptions. First,
I assume that countries’ share in the world stock of human capital remains
constant and, more contentiously, that the variance of countries’ investment
shocks remains unchanged over time. Second, I assume that the model’s ability
to predict the volume of trade is unaltered between 2007 and the long run, so
that even over longer horizons the model’s prediction as to the traded share of
world output falls 52% short of the observed share. Finally, I keep the extent
of China’s trade openness constant. The latter assumption is not essential but
allows me to illustrate the pure effect of increases in global financial integration.
Figure 3.5 plots world trade as a share of world output for different long-
run paths of the average financial friction, assuming a uniform decline across
countries. The first scenario (solid black line) depicts the case in which finan-
cial frictions remain at their model-implied size as of 2007. Unsurprisingly,
the model predicts no further trade growth in this setting. The second, third,
fourth and fifth scenarios describe the more optimistic cases in which the av-
erage friction declines by 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%, respectively.
Figure 3.5: The Growth of World Trade in the Long Run
A 25% decline in the average financial friction raises the model-predicted
level of trade relative to world output to 11.8%, suggesting that further finan-
cial integration may raise world trade by 11% in the long run. A 50% decline
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would result in a long-run increase of 30% and a 75% decline in a long-run
increase of 68%. If financial frictions were to disappear all together, world
trade would grow by a staggering 120%. The present model thus predicts the
marginal impact on trade of declining financial frictions to be increasing.
This finding is noteworthy because, in his discussion of the growth in world
trade, Yi (2003) shows that standard trade models predict declining global tar-
iffs to exert a diminishing impact on world trade. This observation leads him
to describe the exponential growth of world trade as a “qualitative puzzle”.
The analysis presented in this section suggests that, instead of declining trade
barriers, decreasing international financial frictions may account for the expo-
nential increase in the traded share of world GDP in recent years.
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4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I document that a classical model of comparative advantage due
to differences in countries’ relative endowments of production factors can ex-
plain most of the recent growth of world trade. This largely reflects a rise in
the volume of trade between countries with very different capital-labour ratios
but also, to a significant extent, a pattern of international capital flows which
has exacerbated factor-proportions differences, increasing the incentives for
specialisation. My model and calibrations highlight that the growing preva-
lence of factor-proportions trade may explain why financial globalisation has
taken this unexpected turn: if international commodity trade equalises factor
returns − a classical prediction of factor-proportions models −, the impor-
tance of country risk as a determinant of international investment patterns is
enhanced. Net financial flows to relatively safe countries may drive capital-
labour ratios further apart if these countries also account for a small portion
of the world’s effective workforce.
My findings suggest that, while factor-proportions trade continues to ac-
count only for a fraction of world trade, its share has been rising. This calls
for a reexamination of the importance of factor endowments as a determinant
of specialisation. Half a century of empirical research, starting with Lerner
(1952) and Leontieff (1953), has obtained mixed results concerning the ability
of factor-proportions models to explain the factor content of trade.21 However,
recent work by Davis and Weinstein (2001, 2002) shows that a careful appli-
cation of such models to the analysis of trade among OECD countries reveals
a strong relationship between factor endowments and the patterns of exports
and imports. A question which naturally arises from the above is whether the
rise in the volume of North-South trade − and, in particular, in the volume
of China’s trade with the rest of the world − has affected specialisation pat-
terns among developed economies. This paper has provided some suggestive
evidence,22 but a thorough investigation of this issue in future research should
prove instructive.
If a growing share of world trade is due to classical comparative advantage,
this also has significant implications for the analysis of international business
cycles. Since most of world trade used to take place between relatively similar,
highly industrialised countries the international real business cycle (IRBC)
literature has tended to model international trade in a manner consistent with
new trade theory.23 In the light of my findings, it appears worthwhile to
21This literature is surveyed in Helpman (1999).
22See Appendix A2.
23See, among others, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), Kose and Yi (2006) and
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examine how robust the predictions of such models are to the inclusion of
classical motives for trade. For example, in a factor-proportions model the
impact of a trade deficit/surplus on a country’s volume of trade with the rest
of the world generally depends on the country’s comparative advantage, as
explained in Section 2. In a standard IRBC model, by contrast, it depends on
the effect of the trade deficit/surplus on the country’s GDP. The underlying
assumption about the nature of trade may thus crucially affect a model’s
predicted impact of trade imbalances on trade volumes, both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
I have attributed a large share of the recent growth in world trade to the
deepening integration of China into the world economy, and financial glob-
alisation which has given rise to the observed pattern of capital flows from
capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries. Yet neither of these processes is
concluded. My calibrations imply, reasonably, that China has not yet reached
the same degree of trade openness as the group of developed countries and
that some barriers to international asset trade remain. Holding everything
else constant, therefore, these processes should continue to shape the patterns
of specialisation and the growth of world trade for some time to come.
Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008). Although these papers assume Armington trade in inter-
mediate goods which are aggregated by means of a CES production into a composite final
good, this is analytically equivalent with the standard Helpman-Krugman framework.
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Appendix A1 - Factor Endowment Data
A1.1 Data Construction
Factor endowment data is constructed in close correspondence with the method-
ology of the development accounting data, surveyed in Caselli (2005).
I generate estimates of factual capital stocks, Kct, using the perpetual
inventory equation
Kct = Ict + (1− δ)Kct−1,
where It is gross investment in country c at t and δ is the constant depreciation
rate. Investment data in constant, PPP-adjusted 2005 $ is taken from Heston,
Summers and Aten (2009) and, in line with convention, I set δ = .0624. I start
in the year 1950 and, following standard practice, compute Kc0 as Ic0gIc+δ , where
gIc is the average geometric growth rate of the investment series. However, the
choice of Kc0 is immaterial since, with a depreciation rate of 6%, it has little
impact on the estimated capital stock in 1980.
To construct capital stocks in the counterfactual scenario of financial au-
tarky, Kˆct, I proceed as above but use an augmented version of the perpetual
inventory equation
Kˆct = Sct + (1− δ) Kˆct−1,
where Sct are gross domestic savings in country c at t. The reasoning behind
this new equation is as follows: from the national accounting identities,
Sct = Ict + CAct,
where CAct is country c’s current account at t, so Ict = Sct in financially
closed economies. Assuming constant savings rates, the set of counterfactual
capital stocks thus provides a benchmark against which the impact of net
international financial flows on the observed pattern of capital accumulation
can be judged.25 Sct is constructed using the aforementioned investment series
as well as data on the current account (as a percentage of GDP) from the
24The paper’s qualitative results concerning the impact of international capital flows on
the distribution of capital-labour ratios and the resulting patterns of trade are unaffected
by the choice of δ. However, as large-scale cross-border financial flows have increased over
the course of the time period under consideration, a larger δ - which increases the relative
weight of recent investment patterns - increases the quantitative importance of capital flows
as a determinant of present-day capital stocks. Correspondingly, a smaller δ reduces it.
25The assumption that countries’ observed savings rates would have been the same in
counterfactual financial autarky may seem contentious because, in practice, the occurrence
of financial globalisation is likely to have affected countries’ interest rates. However, there
is a large number of studies suggesting that the interest elasticity of savings is close to
zero, both in advanced economies − see, for example, Blinder (1975, 1981), Mankiw (1981),
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) − and in developing countries − see Giovannini (1983).
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IMF’s International Financial Statistics (2010).
Finally, I estimate the stock of human capital based on the size of the
working-age population, using total population figures from Heston, Summers
and Aten (2009) and multiplying with the population share of individuals be-
tween 15 and 65 from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2010).
The “quality adjustment” follows Hall and Jones (1999):
Hct = e
f(sct)Lct,
where Lct is the working-age population and sct is the average number of years
of schooling in country c at t. The function f() is piecewise linear with
f(sct) =

0.13sct if sct ≤ 4
0.10sct if 4 < sct ≤ 8
0.07sct if 8 < sct
,
and sct is based on the average years of schooling in the population above
the age of 15 from Barro and Lee (2010).26 Average years of schooling are
observed quinquennially, most recently in 2010. Since sct moves slowly over
time, a quinquennial observation can plausibly be employed for nearby dates
as well.
Throughout the paper I assume that the accumulation of physical capital
is affected by international financial flows, but the accumulation of human
capital is not.
26The paper’s key empirical findings are, if anything, strengthened if population or the
size of the workforce are used instead of the “quality adjusted” workforce to measure human
capital endowments.
42
A1.2 Shares of World Factor Endowments, 1980 and 2007
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Appendix A2 - Empirical Appendix
A2.1 Specialisation
The model described in Section 2 emphasises the importance of relative factor
endowments for industrial specialisation and, consequently, as a reason for
countries to trade. Appealing to the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, the
model predicts that countries with large amounts of installed physical capital
relative to their endowment of human capital will be exporters of relatively
capital-intensive products. Here, I verify that this prediction of the model is
in tune with the empirical patterns of specialisation and trade using U.S. data
on sector-level imports from its major trading partners.
Romalis (2004) shows that, under the reasonable assumptions that real-life
international product markets are characterised by some degree of imperfect
competition and small trading frictions, a two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model
would predict approximately the following relationship between import pat-
terns and factor proportions:
MUSci
MUSi
= β0 + β1αi
Kc
Hc
+ δc + δi + εci,
where M
US
ci
MUSi
is the share of U.S. imports in industry i sourced from country c, αi
is a measure of the capital intensity of industry i, Kc
Hc
is c’s capital-labour ratio
and δc and δi are, respectively, a full set of country and industry fixed effects.
I will use this regression equation to test the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of the
model for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.
In addition, the model predicts that countries should absorb an increase in
their factor abundance by means of structural transformation, i.e. by becom-
ing more specialised in industries which use the increasingly abundant factor
relatively intensively. This corresponds to the classical Rybczynski theorem. I
will use the equation
4M
US
ci
MUSi
= β˜0 + β˜1αi4Kc
Hc
+ δ˜c + δ˜i + ε˜ci
to test the Rybczynski prediction of the model for the periods 1985-1995 and
1995-2005.
To calculate U.S. sectoral import shares, I use sector-level data on imports
from the U.S. Census, assembled and converted to the 4-digit level of SIC by
Feenstra (2009). The data I employ covers U.S. imports from the 27 largest
economies in more than 400 distinct sectors.
I construct an index of capital intensity at the 4-digit level of SIC from
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data provided in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. In line
with previous papers, I rank industries by the average non-wage share of U.S.
manufacturing value added in the period 1958 to 2005. This ranking, nor-
malised between 0 and 1, is taken as a measure of capital intensity. Note that
this amounts to assuming that the technological capital intensity measured for
the United States in a given sector i is a good description of the properties of
this sector’s production function for any country. This standard assumption
is made partly for reasons of empirical convenience - as detailed sector-level
manufacturing data would not be available for all countries in the given sam-
ple -, and partly because U.S. product and factor markets are considered to
be among the world’s most competitive and frictionless, so that the relative
usage of capital and labour in U.S. manufacturing is most likely to reflect
the true technological properties of different industries, rather than allocative
distortions.
Finally, country shares in world physical and human capital are calculated
on the basis of the physical-capital and human-capital estimates discussed in
Appendix A1.
Table A2.1: Heckscher-Ohlin Regressions
Table A2.2: Rybczynski Regressions
45
The regression results are displayed in Tables A2.1 and A2.2. As columns
(1)-(6) of Table A2.1 show, the role of factor proportions as a determinant of
trading patterns has increased over time: while there appears to have been no
relationship between a country’s relative factor endowments and the type of
goods sourced from it by the U.S. between 1980 and 1990, there has been a
positive and increasingly strong relationship since 1990. As shown in Section
1, this coincides with an increased dispersion of factor proportions among the
world’s largest economies as well as the opening of China to international
goods markets, discussed in Section 3.
In addition to this, columns (1)-(4) of Table A2.2 suggest that a Rybczynski
effect is also borne out by the data: an increase in a country’s capital abun-
dance in the periods 1985-1995 and 1995-2005 seems to have increased that
country’s share of sales of relatively capital-intensive goods to U.S. importers.
A2.2 Investment and Country Risk
Differences in country-specific investment risk play a crucial role in the view
of international asset trade proposed in this paper. In order to provide a
preliminary assessment of the significance of country risk as a determinant of
investment patterns among financially open economies, I estimate a regression
of the form
Ict
Qct
= β0 + β1
Sct
Qct
+ β2σct + δc + δt + εct,
where Ict, Sct and Qct are, respectively, investment, savings and GDP in coun-
try c and year t, σc is a measure of country risk, and δc and δt represent
country and time fixed effects. Note that, as a matter of national accounting,
we should obtain β1 = 1, β2 = 0 if all sample countries are completely closed
to international financial flows.
To construct the panel, I take the three macroeconomic series for the 28
largest economies between 1980 and 2007 from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators (2010). As a first measure of country-specific investment
risk, I use the country risk index compiled by the Political Risk Services Group
(PRSG). This index ranks countries by their economic, financial and political
risk based on PRSG’s own macroeconomic analysis as well as surveys among
international investment professionals. There are two main advantages to us-
ing the PRSG ranking in this context. First, it is compiled monthly, so an
annual risk score can easily be constructed by taking the average over the corre-
sponding 12-month period. Second, it largely captures countries’ idiosyncratic
investment risk, as emphasised by the model in Section 2.
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Table A2.3: Investment and Country Risk
Table A2.3 reports the regression results. The first noteworthy finding
appears in column 2. The estimated coefficient on Sct
Qct
- sometimes referred to
as the “savings retention” coefficient - is around .4. This relatively low value
suggests a high degree of financial globalisation.27 The estimated value of this
coefficient is almost unchanged when country risk is added to the regression
in column (3). The country risk score itself is shown to be associated with
significantly lower investment shares of GDP. Moreover, the economic impact
of changes in country risk is substantial: an improvement in the average risk
score from the 75th percentile of the country distribution (31) to the 25th
percentile (16) would raise the average investment share by 3.0 percentage
points. By way of comparison, an increase in the average savings rate from
the 25th percentile of the country distribution (21%) to the 75th percentile
(25%) would only raise the investment share by 1.4 percentage points.
27Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) estimate savings retention coefficients as one of several
possible measures of financial globalisation for different time periods. Using a similar sample
of countries, they report a coefficient of .83 for 1946-1972, and .75 for 1973-2000
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